The government can function if the minority party has either the incentive to make the majority fail or the power to make the majority fail. It cannot function if it has both.
Ezra has a series of filibuster-related posts up today with are worth reading, beginning with an overview.
This might seem an odd moment to argue that the Senate is fundamentally broken and repairs should top our list of priorities. After all, the Senate passed a $900 billion health-care bill Thursday morning. But consider the context: Arlen Specter’s defection from the Republican Party earlier this year gave Democrats 60 votes in the Senate — a larger majority than either party has had since the ’70s. Democrats also controlled the House and the presidency, and were working in the aftermath of a financial crisis that occurred on a Republican president’s watch. This was a test of whether a party could govern when everything was stacked in its favor.
The answer seems to be, well, not really. The Democrats ended up focusing on health-care reform’s low-hanging fruit: the bill the Senate ultimately passed does much more to increase coverage than it does to address the considerably harder problem of cost control, it strengthens the existing private insurance system and it does not include a public insurance option. And Democrats still could not find a single Republican vote, which meant they had to give Nebraska a coupon entitling it to a free Medicaid expansion and hand Joe Lieberman a voucher that’s good for anything he wants. If the Senate cannot govern effectively even when history conspires to free its hand, then it cannot govern.
There’s an interview with a political scientist, who “published a study showing that about eight percent of major bills in the 1960s faced filibusters or filibuster threats and 70 percent of bills in the current decade did the same.” The point being, the filibuster has not, historically, been a routine supermajority requirement.
There are two interviews with currently sitting Senators about how the filibuster rule might be restored to what it originally was — a guarantee that no bill could be passed without some opportunity for debate.
First, Senator Tom Harkin, who wants it known that he was actively in favor of fixing the filibuster even when his party was in the majority minority, brings back a proposal that he and Joe Lieberman (!) came up with in 1995:
The idea is to give some time for extended debate but eventually allow a majority to work its will. I do believe there’s some reason to have extended debate. If a group of senators filibusters a bill, you want to take their worries seriously. Make sure you’re not missing something. My proposal will do that. It says that on the first vote, you need 60. Then you have to wait two days, and on the third day, you need 57 votes. And then you need to wait two days, and on the third day, it’s 54 votes. And then you’d wait another two days, and on the third day, it would be 51 votes.
And there’s an interview with Jeff Merkeley (Oregon has really great Senators, incidentally), who has this suggestion:
…one question we’re asking is how do you get two-thirds of the body to agree to change the rules when there’s immediate pressure for the minority to protect themselves? Your rule changes could kick in in 6 to 8 years. Or you could have rule changes that are designed to trigger when the two sides are more or less even. So when there’s a 55-45 majority, it wouldn’t kick in, but it would at 52-48. Or think about with nominations. We’re really paralyzing the executive branch.
Back to quoting Ezra:
The danger of reforming the Senate is that, like health-care reform before it, it comes to seem a partisan issue. It isn’t. Members of both parties often take the fact that neither Democrats nor Republicans can govern effectively to mean they benefit from the filibuster half the time. In reality, the country loses the benefits of a working legislature all the time.
But members of both parties have become attached to this idea that they can block objectionable legislation even when they’re relatively powerless. This is evidence, perhaps, that both parties are so used to the victories of obstruction that they have forgotten their purpose is to amass victories through governance. Either way, a world in which the majority can pass its agenda is a better one, a place where the majority party is held accountable for its ideas and not for the gridlock and inaction furnished by the Senate’s rules.
