Cartoonists With Attitude

From The New York Times:

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on Sunday granted women the right to vote and run in future municipal elections, the biggest change in a decade for women in a puritanical kingdom that practices strict separation of the sexes, including banning women from driving.

Saudi women, who are legally subject to male chaperones for almost any public activity, hailed the royal decree as an important, if limited, step toward making them equal to their male counterparts. They said the uprisings sweeping the Arab world for the past nine months — along with sustained domestic pressure for women’s rights and a more representative form of government — prompted the change.

“There is the element of the Arab Spring, there is the element of the strength of Saudi social media, and there is the element of Saudi women themselves, who are not silent,” said Hatoon al-Fassi, a history professor and one of the women who organized a campaign demanding the right to vote this spring. “Plus, the fact that the issue of women has turned Saudi Arabia into an international joke is another thing that brought the decision now.”

This is obviously wonderful news — and a great credit to the work of activist Saudi women.

That said, it’s important to keep in mind that voting is a less important right in Saudi Arabia than most places; as Max Fisher points out, “voting in a non-democratic society where elected bodies merely ‘advise’ the monarchy” may not have much practical importance. And there are four years before the next election cycle, giving King Abdullah time to backtrack.

But it’s still a potentially important symbolic victory; it shows that Saudi women’s activism can’t simply be ignored. Next, hopefully, will come the right to drive, which Saudi women have been pushing for.

Juan Cole has more on the political context.

More from the Times story:

Despite the snail’s pace of change, women on Sunday were optimistic that the right to vote and run would give them leverage to change the measures, big and small, that hem them in.

“It is a good sign, and we have to take advantage of it,” said Maha al-Qahtani, one of the women who defied the ban on driving this year, said of the king’s announcement. “But we still need more rights.”

Women require the permission of a male sponsor, or “mahram,” to travel or undertake much of the commercial activity needed to run a business. They inhabit separate and often inferior spaces in restaurants, banks and health clubs, when they are allowed in at all.

I’d really recommend reading the International Crisis Group’s briefing on Libya (or at least read the executive summary, which is only three pages long). (pdf link) It has a lot of interesting background to the current conflict.

Here’s a brief passage from the executive summary:

The prospect for Libya, but also North Africa as a whole, is increasingly ominous, unless some way can be found to induce the two sides in the armed conflict to negotiate a compromise allowing for an orderly transition to a post Qaddafi, post-Jamahiriya state that has legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan people.

A political breakthrough is by far the best way out of the costly situation created by the military impasse. This will require a ceasefire, the deployment of a peacekeeping force to monitor and guarantee this under a UN mandate and the immediate opening of serious negotiations between regime and opposition representatives to secure agreement on a peaceful transition to a new, more legitimate political order. Such a breakthrough almost certainly necessitates involvement by a third party or third parties accepted by both sides. A joint political initiative by the Arab League and the African Union – the former viewed more favourably by the opposition, the latter preferred by the regime – is one possibility to lead to such an agreement. They could build on ongoing efforts by the African Union and the UN Special Envoy, Abdul Ilah Khatib. But no breakthrough can happen without the leadership of the revolt and NATO rethinking their current stance.

Their repeatedly proclaimed demand that “Qaddafi must go” systematically confuses two quite different objectives. To insist that, ultimately, he can have no role in the post-Jamahiriya political order is one thing, and almost certainly reflects the opinion of a majority of Libyans as well as of the outside world. But to insist that he must go now, as the precondition for any negotiation, including that of a ceasefire, is to render a ceasefire all but impossible and so to maximise the prospect of continued armed conflict. To insist that he both leave the country and face trial in the International Criminal Court is virtually to ensure that he will stay in Libya to the bitter end and go down fighting.

Only an immediate ceasefire is consistent with the purpose originally claimed for NATO’s intervention, that of protecting civilians. The argument that Qaddafi has failed to deliver a ceasefire ignores the fact that Security Council Resolution 1973 did not place responsibility for achieving a ceasefire exclusively on one side and that no cease fire can be sustained unless it is observed by both sides. The complaint that Qaddafi cannot be trusted is one that can be levelled at any number of leaders on one side or another of a civil war. The way to deal with the issue is to establish the political conditions – by mobilising through concerted diplomacy a strong international consensus in favour of an immediate, unconditional ceasefire and serious negotiations – that will increase the likelihood that he keeps to his undertakings.

Another passage, this time from the report itself, suggesting that western media has exaggerated Qaddafi’s brutalities. This passage was also quoted on FrumForum, in a post entitled Have Qaddafi’s Abuses Been Exaggerated?; FrumForum also cited reports from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch.

I realize, of course, that Qaddafi has beyond any doubt been brutal and violent. But I do think it matters, when asking if the NATO intervention was justified, to know whether or not claims of impending genocide or large-scale massacres were true.

At the same time, much Western media coverage has from the outset presented a very one-sided view of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no real security challenge.

This version would appear to ignore evidence that the protest movement exhibited a violent aspect from very early on. While there is no doubt that many and quite probably a large majority of the people mobilised in the early demonstrations were indeed intent on demonstrating peacefully, there is also evidence that, as the regime claimed, the demonstrations were infiltrated by violent elements.

Likewise, there are grounds for questioning the more sensational reports that the regime was using its air force to slaughter demonstrators, let alone engaging in anything remotely warranting use of the term “genocide”.

That said, the repression was real enough, and its brutality shocked even Libyans.

* * *

Josh Rogin argues that last week’s failed House resolution to defund operations in Libya has been widely misunderstood, and was in fact a stealth authorization of our involvement in Libya.

The vote failed 180-238 – but, in fact, there were more than enough lawmakers to pass the measure. Of the 149 Democrats who stuck with the president, up to 70 of them are totally opposed to the Libya intervention and want to see it completely defunded as soon as possible. They voted “no” on the Rooney’s bill because they thought it was too weak, did not cut off all funds, and implicitly authorized the intervention. These 70 Democrats make up the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC), the largest caucus within the House Democratic Caucus, whose leadership includes Reps. Mike Honda (D-CA), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) and Raul Grijalva (D-AZ).

“Members of Congress voted no because the bill provided funding and legal authority for everything we’re currently doing. It was back door authorization. Members didn’t support authorizing what we’re doing now in Libya,” Michael Shank, Honda’s spokesman, told The Cable. “The majority of the CPC voted no on the Rooney vote because of this.” In other words, if the GOP had put forth a stronger anti-Libya resolution, the progressive Democrats would have joined them and it would have passed. Despite what Clinton or other administration officials may say, the bill’s failure cannot be seen as an endorsement of the Libya war.

* * *

Hilary Clinton should be ashamed of herself for this quote:

“But the bottom line is, whose side are you on? Are you on Qadhafi’s side or are you on the side of the aspirations of the Libyan people and the international coalition that has been created to support them? For the Obama Administration, the answer to that question is very easy.”

* * *

And finally, two ironically juxtiposed quotes (via Glenn Greenwald):

“Broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake” — President Barack Obama, March 28, 2011

“The top U.S. admiral involved in the Libya war admitted to a U.S. congressman that NATO forces are trying to kill Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. The same admiral also said he anticipated the need for ground troops in Libya after Qaddafi falls.” — Josh Rogin, Foreign Policy, yesterday.

photo credit: John Tann

At the Debate Annex, in response to my criticism of Obama for not clearing our war in Libya with Congress, Daran asks a fair question:

Setting aside the Constitutionality issue, how do you feel about the Nato action overall? Your first post was strongly opposed. But subsequently you appeared to equivocate (as did/do I).

I just don’t think that force of war — which is what NATO is using — is a reliable tool for achieving humanitarian goals. People say “we’re going to use war to achieve humanitarian goal X,” but the truth is, they have NO idea if they’re actually going to succeed. (Unless goal X is “cause a great deal of destruction and death,” in which case they can be fairly certain of success, but I think their claim to a humanitarian intent would be significantly weakened.)

When it comes to humanitarian goals, war is an extremely chancy tool. The people who claim that they know what they’re doing, and they’re going to be successful at using warfare as a humanitarian tool to achieve humanitarian goals without enormous bloodshed — I think those people are either self-deceiving, or simply liars. Even if they’re entirely sincere, the chances of not really achieving humanitarian ends, or of achieving them only at inhumane costs, are very high.

It’s a little like seeing a deadly poisonous wasp buzzing a few inches from a little child’s eye, while the child is in a big crowd of children. Sure, I could draw my handgun and shoot the wasp to prevent it from stinging the child to death. But the odds of that plan actually working are small, and the odds of a tragic unintended result are unacceptably high.

So even if someone says to me, “don’t you care if a small child gets stung to death,” I’m against that plan. Even if the plan works, and in retrospect people are saying “see, you were wrong to disagree,” I’m against that plan.

So, to answer Daran’s question, I’m back to being opposed.

UPDATE: See Daran’s response to me here.

The New York Times reports on the process by which President Obama came to the Orwellian legal conclusion that our actions in Libya are not “hostilities,” and thus do not need Congress’ approval under the War Powers Resolution. As the Times dryly says, “A sticking point for some skeptics was whether any mission that included firing missiles from drone aircraft could be portrayed as not amounting to hostilities.”

The administration followed an unusual process in developing its position. Traditionally, the Office of Legal Counsel solicits views from different agencies and then decides what the best interpretation of the law is. The attorney general or the president can overrule its views, but rarely do.

In this case, however, Ms. Krass was asked to submit the Office of Legal Counsel’s thoughts in a less formal way to the White House, along with the views of lawyers at other agencies. After several meetings and phone calls, the rival legal analyses were submitted to Mr. Obama, who is a constitutional lawyer, and he made the decision.

It seems very likely that Obama knew what outcome he wanted, and rather than seek the most authoritative opinion, he picked the one that came to the conclusions he desired. As Jack Balkin points out, this is substantially similar to how Bush operated.

By bypassing a careful set of procedures designed to produce careful legal opinions, George W. Bush was able to say that he was following the OLC, or at least a rump of the OLC. But he was effectively undermining the OLC’s function as an honest broker of executive branch opinions. Obama also bypassed this same careful set of procedures by canvassing various lawyers until he found opinions he liked better than the OLC’s. If one is disturbed by Bush’s misuse of the process for vetting legal questions, one should be equally disturbed by Obama’s irregular procedures.

Andrew Sullivan writes:

There’s no inherent Constitutional bar on the president making the final decision on legal matters. But the tradition of an independent legal entity at the Justice Department to provide objective analysis is designed to prevent the president cherry-picking legal decisions as he sees fit. From Bush to Obama, we have now seen conclusively that the presidency is out of control when it comes to war and peace. Given the obvious irregularities that brought the president to such a betrayal of a core campaign message, and his previous statements on presidential war-making power, we need this Congress to fight back.

The Congress needs to vote to end this war, illegally begun, illegally continued, and defended with a presidential hauteur more fitting a monarch than a president. If we cannot restrain or shame even Obama in the face of this individual act of war, how on earth will we ever prevent future presidents from doing more? If we do not stop this legally unaccountable war-making machine now, when will we?

I’d really like to vote for a President who respects the Constitution and isn’t overly willing to go to war. Unfortunately, that means giving my vote to a third party candidate, because it’s obvious that neither major party would ever nominate such a candidate.

From Politico, a reason to love Dennis Kucinich (and his co-sponsors, Reps. Michael Capuano (D-Mass.) and Dan Burton (R-Ind.)):

Seeking to avoid a showdown over Libya, House GOP leaders have pulled back from a floor vote on a resolution by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) that would bar U.S. involvement in the NATO-led campaign to topple Muammar Qhadafi.

GOP leaders were scrambling on Wednesday morning to come up with an alternative plan for considering the measure. These could include having the Armed Services or Foreign Affairs committees draft back-up proposals.

Citing “lots of unrest on both sides of the aisle,” a senior House GOP aide said Republican leaders are still working through their options.

Another senior Republican staffer said House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) “is concerned that if this were to come to the floor now, it would pass” and could adversely affect the NATO mission in Libya.

Daniel Larison — by the way, how weird is it that my favorite foreign policy blogger writes for American Conservative Magazine? — wryly comments:

If the resolution passed, it probably would adversely affect the mission in Libya. Of course, it is supposed to affect the mission adversely. The purpose of the resolution is to withdraw U.S. forces from that mission.

Normally, this wouldn’t be much of an issue — the House leadership can bury bills they don’t like more-or-less forever. However, as Politico reports:

Because the Kucinich proposal relates to the 1973 War Powers Act, it is considered privileged under House rules, meaning Kucinich could force a floor vote even if Democratic and Republican leaders are opposed to doing so. The resolution “ripens” next week, making it possible for Kucinich to bring about a vote when Congress returns from next week’s recess.

It’s also possible that the GOP will allow Kucinich’s resolution to come to a vote Friday (today). Some House Republicans are supporting a weaker, toothless resolution instead, which expresses “disapproval” of the Obama administration’s actions. So the news today should be interesting.

Foreign Policy has an article explaining the relevance of the War Powers Act to our Libya campaign:

We are at a constitutional crossroads, similar to the one the United States confronted in 1973 when Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, which set the 60-day limit, over Richard Nixon’s veto. The Constitution famously grants Congress the power to declare war, but Nixon continued to fight in Vietnam for three years after Congress had withdrawn the Gulf of Tonkin resolution authorizing the conflict.

Faced with this plain constitutional violation, Congress acted decisively to restore the system of checks and balances. For centuries, the president and Congress had wrangled over the kind of actions that counted as a “war” for constitutional purposes, with presidents exploiting legal ambiguities to cut Congress out of key decisions. The act broke this impasse by imposing a time limit on all “hostilities” — a functional term meant to eliminate legalistic evasions the White House had developed over what counted as “war.” Henceforward, the 60-day deadline would apply whenever the president began “hostilities,” and if he failed to gain congressional approval, the act gave him 30 days to terminate the military operation.

This clear and simple 60/30-day setup is especially important at a time when other restraints on presidential war-making have atrophied.

The White House claims that its actions are legal under the War Powers Act, but I’m not clear on what their legal theory is.

Larison again:

The strange thing about the way the administration has handled this since March is that Congress would have likely signed off on the Libyan war if it had been asked to debate and vote on it. There must normally be enough Republican hawks and reliable Democratic partisans that they could have pushed through an authorizing resolution without too much difficulty. The remarkable thing is that the sheer contempt that the administration has shown for our law and representative institutions may have finally alienated enough people to turn them against a military intervention that they might otherwise have supported.

Larison also points out that the Administration might just ignore whatever resolution Congress passes.

I remain on the fence about whether our intervention in Libya will actually accomplish much good in the long run. But I’m not on the fence about wars of choice: I’m against them. And I’m not on the fence about Congress’ right to decide on when the US goes to war. Usually, Congress seems entirely too happy to abdicate that responsibility; maybe Libya will be an exception.

Anyway, it’s very late and I’m very tired and I’m not at all sure this post is coherent. But I’m posting it anyway. So there!

Well, it appears that egg is on my face after I worried about disaster in Libya last night. I genuinely hope this egg remains on my face forever. From the BBC’s constantly-updating Libya sidebar:

To recap on the events of the last few hours. Following last night’s UN resolution in favour of military intervention, Col Gaddafi’s regime announced an immediate ceasefire at about 1240 GMT. Since then we’ve had reports of continued shelling in some cities, including Misrata, but elsewhere, suggestions that the security situation may be improving. The UK, France and US have said they want to see real evidence of a ceasefire on the ground – words are not enough, they insist.

How solid this ceasefire is remains unclear; there are still doubts and reports of conflict. David writes:

Government forces continue to pound rebel-held cities, which means either that Qaddafi is just playing for time with a bogus ceasefire announcement or some of his forces are going a bit rogue. Either way, it essentially is a dare on whether the UN will follow through and launch some of those strikes on Libyan ordinance.

Nonetheless, I’d be blind not to admit that it now looks possible that, from a humanitarian and liberalization perspective, the UN action will wind up doing a lot of good. We’ll have to keep on watching, fingers crossed.

Andrew Sullivan’s readers make a lot of good points in favor of the UN action (and the US’s participation in it). (The dissents from Andrew’s readers are often my favorite things to read on his blog.)

That said, there are still legitimate reasons to worry. For those interested in the voice of caution, I’d recommend reading:

Michael Cohen on the questions not being asked:

If Assad starts massacring Syrian or the Saudi leadership starts killing pro-democracy protesters is the United States undermining the cause of freedom and liberty in the Arab world by doing nothing?[...]

What if the war ends up in stalemate do we accept a status quo or do we send troops to Tripoli to liberate the entire country (Shadi seems to think we should)? What if the rebels are successful in overthrowing Gaddafi and begin massacring those loyal to Gaddafi? Would we have to respond to this violence as well? And to this point who exactly are the rebels that we are no going to war on behalf of?

What if our military intervention creates a power vacuum in Libya leading to political instability and violence? What is our responsibility to clean up the mess i.e. the Pottery Barn rule?

Evan Levine on what we’re signing up for (and why Libya?):

While an argument can be made that to do nothing is effectively taking a side, i.e. Gaddafi has the initiative and will likely prevail without intervention, military strikes will definitely put us squarely behind the anti-Gaddafi forces. We will be responsible for their actions on the ground, now and in the future. Is anyone prepared for that? Is anyone prepared to intervene again if anti-Gaddafi forces no longer seem to be in the “right side” anymore? One can create an endless number of scenarios with “what ifs,” but just because we can agree that Gaddafi is “bad” that doesn’t necessarily mean that the other side is “good.” It’s far too easy, and extremely appealing, to turn things into black and white, good guys and bad guys, but the world, and history, just doesn’t work like that.

Daniel Larison on the moral hazard of intervention:

The more significant problem is that this has set a precedent that the states that were prepared to intervene in Libya will be expected to do the same in many more cases. An arbitrary, rather odd decision to treat the Libyan civil war as the greatest political crisis in the world will create the expectation of foreign support in other internal conflicts. That is likely to encourage rebellions and civil conflict. If a group believes it can win foreign support and political concessions by provoking a sufficiently brutal crackdown, that will make it more likely to rise up against its government, which may lead to humanitarian catastrophes that the “responsibility to protect” is supposed to prevent. As Alan Kuperman has argued (via Michael), the “responsibility to protect” creates a moral hazard:

The emerging norm, by raising hopes of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and raising its likelihood of success. Intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but it is usually too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. It creates a moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect these groups against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur.

Glenn Greenwald reminds us that there’s still this thing called the Constitution.

And finally, Mark Lynch discusses some possible outcomes:

The intervention is a high-stakes gamble. If it succeeds quickly, and Qaddafi’s regime crumbles as key figures jump ship in the face of its certain demise, then it could reverse the flagging fortunes of the Arab uprisings. Like the first Security Council resolution on Libya, it could send a powerful message that the use of brutal repression makes regime survival less rather than more likely. It would put real meat on the bones of the “Responsibility to Protect” and help create a new international norm. And it could align the U.S. and the international community with al-Jazeera and the aspirations of the Arab protest movement. I have heard from many protest leaders from other Arab countries that success in Libya would galvanize their efforts, and failure might crush their hopes.

But if it does not succeed quickly, and the intervention degenerates into a long quagmire of air strikes, grinding street battles, and growing pressure for the introduction of outside ground forces, then the impact could be quite different. Despite the bracing scenes of Benghazi erupting into cheers at the news of the Resolution, Arab support for the intervention is not nearly as deep as it seems and will not likely survive an extended war. If Libyan civilians are killed in airstrikes, and especially if foreign troops enter Libyan territory, and images of Arabs killed by U.S. forces replace images of brave protestors battered by Qaddafi’s forces on al-Jazeera, the narrative could change quickly into an Iraq-like rage against Western imperialism. What began as an indigenous peaceful Arab uprising against authoritarian rule could collapse into a spectacle of war and intervention.

And on another subject, some interesting information on how the decision was made within the Obama administration.

So we’re now preparing to institute a no-fly zone in Libya — an act of war which Congress has not debated and apparently will not be given the chance to debate (although perhaps there’ll be a rubber-stamp vote after the fact).

Hey, remember when the country was broke, and couldn’t take on major new expenses? Well, forget that. We’re getting a brand new war, baby, and our credit is always good for that! We don’t have any exit strategy, other than Ann-Marie Slaughter’s whimsical supposition that we’ll put in a no-fly zone and maybe Qaddafi will give up immediately. We don’t have any coherent explanation of how a no-fly zone prevents Qaddafi from doing what he’s already doing, which is winning with his tanks and his heavy ground weaponry. We don’t have any conception of the national interest that explains why we’re morally compelled to save Libyans from Qaddafi while we won’t lift a finger (not even diplotmatically) to stop other dictators who are just as awful.

I can’t pretend to know what will happen. Maybe Slaughter is right, and a no-fly zone will put things to right and get the Arab street to see the US as a benevolent force. I certainly hope she’s right, because I suspect that Obama has already decided in favor of the no-fly zone.

But Slaughter’s optimistic scenario doesn’t seem likely to me. It’s unlikely that Qaddafi is going to give up based on a no-fly zone alone. It’s unlikely that, once we’ve committed to helping the rebels with a no-fly zone, we’ll refuse to help with troops on the ground once the no-fly zone fails to stop Qaddafi. It’s unlikely that we won’t have soon have a third war in the middle east.¹ It’s unlikely that anyone in the middle east will see the US as benevolent once we start accidentally bombing weddings.

Steve Clemons writes:

…the question really should be is whether a no-fly zone gets the Opposition to a tilting point where they can succeed. The answer is no. A no-fly zone has become an emotional touch point for many who want to help the struggling and brave Libya Opposition — but it doesn’t change facts on the ground.

Slaughter is right that revolutions are messy and once the intoxication of change wears off, there are huge headaches, new conflicts, different political rivalries. But she says that if we allow Gaddafi to win and chop down young protesters, we will have been on the wrong side of things. Again, supporting a no-fly zone is emotional distraction “for us” and does little to help “them.”

She doesn’t deal with the reality that without somehow supporting the Opposition to force a “no drive zone” on Gaddafi’s tanks and arming the rebels with intel and bullets, a no-fly zone will look in retrospect like self-indulgent impotence.

What we desperately need in this country is humility. The military, contrary to what so many Americans believe, is not a magic nation-building wand. Bombing Qaddafi’s airfields won’t create democracy; it’s won’t prevent civil war; and it won’t secure admiration for us throughout the middle east.

When the no-fly zone fails to work, we’ll invade; our troops will be on the ground. Inevitably, mistakes will be made; weddings will be bombed, innocent children will be in the vehicle our helicopters machine-guns, our bad apples will be caught committing rape and torture. Slaughter’s claim that embroiling ourselves in a war in Libya will make us loved in the middle east is beyond cockeyed optimism.

As Clemons points out, we don’t actually face a choice between doing nothing and starting a war (and again, a no-fly zone is an act of war). We can provide assistance with formal recognition, with weapons, with advice, with military intelligence, with communications; but direct military participation by the US isn’t something we should do because it’ll make us feel virtuous, or because everyone’s yelling “we have to do something,” or because we think that maybe, if things work out juuuuussst right, it’ll turn out to be the right thing to do.

The folks who favor war do the same trick every time; when they argue for the benefits of war, only the benefits are discussed, and the enormously probable disastrous outcomes are ignored or waved aside. Simultaneously, all alternatives to war are painted as inevitably leading to holocausts, as if no conflict in the world has ever failed to become a holocaust if the US didn’t invade.

A no-fly zone is a road that leads towards a fuller war, and I suspect that it’s a one-way road. We could easily end up in Libya for another ten or fifteen years, at the cost of hundreds of American soldiers and tens of thousands of Libyan civilians dead, and gain nothing in exchange; no new democracy flowering, no admiration from the Arab street, no peace. If recent history is any guide, that is the most likely outcome.

War isn’t the source of democracy. We are not God, and we do not have the ability to right every wrong and prevent every evil. And war isn’t the alternative to disaster and slaughter; war itself is inherently a disaster, inherently slaughter.

We should go to war only when all other options are exhausted. And we’re not there yet.

1. Unless, of course, our initial countermeasures are completely ineffectual and everyone we’re trying to rescue is slaughtered by tomorrow, making further intervention utterly pointless, a not-at-all impossible outcome, alas.

This month may well be a moment of history-changing importance, but I haven’t been posting about it because, frankly, I don’t feel like I have anything intelligent to say. But I thought this post — entitled “Why Do Protests Bring Down Regimes?” — was too interesting not to quote at length.

The key to answer this question, I think, is to understand the basic nature of authoritarian rule. While the news media focus on “the dictator”, almost all authoritarian regimes are really coalitions involving a range of players with different resources, including incumbent politicians but also other elites like businessmen, bureaucrats, leaders of mass organizations like labor unions and political parties, and, of course, specialists in coercion like the military or the security forces. These elites are pivotal in deciding the fate of the regime and as long as they continue to ally themselves with the incumbent leadership, the regime is likely to remain stable. By contrast, when these elites split and some defect and decide to throw in their lot with the opposition, then the incumbents are in danger.

So where do protests come in? The problem is that in authoritarian regimes there are few sources of reliable information that can help these pivotal elites decide whom to back. Restrictions on media freedom and civil and political rights limit the amount and quality of information that is available on both the incumbents and the opposition. Moreover, the powerful incentives to pay lip service to incumbent rulers make it hard to know what to make of what information there is. Rumor and innuendo thus play a huge role in all authoritarian regimes.

In this context, protests are excellent opportunities for communication. Broadly, there are two types of messages being sent. The one that gets the most scholarly attention is at the level of protesters trying to convince other citizens that “people like them” hate the incumbents and are willing to act. This is, for example, why educated activists from organizations like the April 6 Movement in Egypt organized demonstrations in working class neighborhoods and tried to dress like ‘ordinary’ kids so working people would see people like themselves in the protests.

However, the other kind of message is the one that protests send to pivotal elites, who are weighing staying the course against the potential costs and benefits from switching sides. In the Egyptian case, the pivotal elites seemed to have included, on the one side, “national capitalists” associated with part of the military, and, on the other side, the beneficiaries of privatization and Mubarak’s economic “reforms”, associated with his son Gamal. When the “swing voters”, the semi-autonomous Intelligence Services (mukhabarat), moved behind the national capitalist faction, Mubarak was finished. Much of the action in the last days of January seems to have consisted of various high profile figures using the protest to signal their allegiance to or defection from Mubarak.

Read the whole thing.